In 1978, Mijuskovic examines Franz Brentano’s Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint in an article entitled “Brentano’s Theory of Consciousness.” The reader will immediately notice a change in tone Mijuskovic takes from his usual formulation of premises and uses of the simplicity argument. He uses Brentano’s language to show two key aspects of his theory of consciousness. Despite this change of approach, the conclusions about Brentano’s treatment of the immateriality of consciousness run parallel to previous formulations of the simplicity argument. Mijuskovic examines the immortality of the soul and the unity of consciousness within Brentano’s work; thus, referring to the first and second uses of the simplicity argument.
Ben Mijuskovic
Hume on Space (and Time)
“Hume on Space (and Time)” explores the way in which Hume’s presentation of space-time depends upon Leibniz’s. Hume’s interaction with the Leibniz-Clark correspondence challenges him to address the simplicity argument in regard to his view on the immateriality of space. Mijuskovic concludes:
As Leibniz had insisted that our thoughts are ultimately simple, unified, and indivisible (because the monads are), so Hume held that the visible and tangible points, which have no dimensions, are ultimately qualitative simples and ideal, that is, mental existences. [1]
Although Hume did not agree about the nature of the mind as a unified, simple substance, his presentation of thoughts illustrates the strength of the simplicity argument’s premise embraced by both sides of the larger debate regarding the nature of mind. He cannot overlook the fact the objects (thoughts) of the bundle of perceptions (mind) do not possess an extended or material existence. This concession makes Hume’s philosophy of mind, in part, a candidate for study in the history of the simplicity argument.
The Simplicity Argument Versus A Materialist Theory of Consciousness
Mijuskovic writes “The Simplicity Argument versus a Materialist Theory of Consciousness” to challenge A. M. Armstrong’s A Materialist Theory of Mind. The reader will immediately notice his thought is more refined in this presentation as an overarching philosophy of mind that is juxtaposed with that of Armstrong’s. Just two years after the publication of The Achilles of Rationalist Arguments, Mijuskovic presents a philosophical defense that spans more than two millennia of Western philosophy from Plato to Sartre. This particular presentation also illustrates a future line of reasoning that Mijuskovic develops in Contingent Immaterialism. As a theory of consciousness, the simplicity argument promotes an existential freedom that can be solipsistic at times – as seen in Sartre. Mijuskovic remarks, “[i]n Sartre’s early works, the Simplicity Argument functions to ground an explosive, outward directed model of freedom.” [1] The resultant isolation or loneliness produced explains some of the driving subconscious forces humans possess. In addition to the immaterial premise, loneliness is a major topic of research for Mijuskovic as a natural progression of thought from the theory of consciousness presented in this article.
Absolute Morality & Wittgenstein and Russell
Following The Achilles of Rationalist Arguments, Mijuskovic wrote an article for Journal of Thought entitled “The Simplicity Argument and Absolute Morality.” He focuses attention upon the moral idealism of Ralph Cudworth, Ralph Waldo Emerson and Edmund Husserl. This article lays the groundwork for the second chapter of Contingent Immaterialism, which later he describes as the fifth use for the simplicity argument. Just one year after the publication of ARA, it illustrates the broadening of the uses of the simplicity argument as Mijuskovic advances his study in history, particularly in the treatment of Husserl.
In 1976, Mijuskovic’s rapid publishing pace continues with “The Simplicity Argument in Wittgenstein and Russell.” From the opening paragraph, Mijuskovic anticipates further work by his passing mention of Hegel, Marx, Bergson, Husserl and Sartre as candidates for study. He also reveals two more uses for the simplicity argument. After reiterating the fifth use on the immateriality of meanings within moral idealism, Mijuskovic discusses a sixth use within the freedom of self-consciousness in Hegel, Bergson and Sartre. He then briefly alludes to a seventh, and final, use within arguments related to the consciousness of time by Schelling, Schopenhauer and Bergson.
In addition to laying the groundwork for his future articles, Mijuskovic discusses the immateriality of meanings in the works of Wittgenstein and Russell. A simple summary of his argument on Wittgenstein is, “[he] substituted an identity and unity of meaning for the traditional concepts of the identity and unity of consciousness”.[1] Similarly, Russell grapples with meanings in relation to his philosophy of mind: “What Russell really is engaged in is a theory of consciousness, a philosophy of mind, which is unfortunately disguised from him by his concentrated emphasis on a theory of meaning”.[2] Although there is no direct attribution to the simplicity argument by either philosopher, both Wittgenstein and Russell develop their concepts of meaning with premises akin to the unity, identity and simplicity premises found within the simplicity argument.
The Transcendental Analytic Revisited
Following the publishing of The Achilles of Rationalist Arguments, Mijuskovic writes “The General Conclusion of the Argument of the Transcendental Analytic” to continue what he addresses in his earlier work “The Premise of the Transcendental Analytic.” The first edition Transcendental Analytic and Paralogisms were edited substantially in the second edition, which begs many questions, including whether Kant operates under different presuppositions between these two. Mijuskovic contends the first edition is premised upon time consciousness – in agreement with N. Kemp Smith’s Commentary. From this Kant moves to demonstrate the unity of consciousness as he progresses through the Transcendental Deduction. Kant’s arguments for the unity of consciousness would be incoherent without this priority of the temporal nature of cause and effect prior to unification of these same events. In the order of logic, continuity must precede unity otherwise consciousness would cease.
Additionally, Mijuskovic explains a key dichotomy which will appear later in the simplicity argument’s history: Thus we know a priori (universally and necessarily) that all experience will have constitutive elements of both quantifiable extensity and qualitative intensity and that all possible experience must conform to these conditions in order to be manifested as human awareness.[1] A dichotomy of quantity and quality directly correlates to extension (physicality) and inextension (immateriality). Properties of consciousness should be classified by qualitative properties. All other properties will have a quantitative extension or physicality. This distinction is fundamental to the premise of the immateriality of thought which grounds the simplicity of consciousness. Physical/material properties cannot account for the nature of consciousness because they were never intended to do so. Only inextended, qualitative properties can logically apply to consciousness. Mijuskovic following Kant makes it clear the two must be made distinct since they apply to completely different categories of experience.
In sum, Mijuskovic concludes: First, we begin with the indubitabilty of our temporal consciousness; and then we proceed through a “deduction” showing that such an awareness depends upon a complicated interworking of transcendental activities of the productive imagination (A99-104), which finally, results in mutually conditioning ‘effects’ (both transcendental and empirical) of an awareness of a temporal unity and continuity of one consciousness and one spacetime continuum, the latter as apprehended in our representation of one unified system of nature.[2]
Ben Lazare Mijuskovic (1937-2026) 